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Impact of Charter School Attendance on Student Achievement in Michigan
ABSTRACT
Proponents of school reform have argued that charter schools and vouchers can provide adequate
market pressure to improve the performance of traditional public schools.  While the number of charter
schools and student enrollment have burgeoned, relatively little attention has been paid to their effects on
student achievement.  Proponents of charter schools suggest a direct effect on student achievement through
the restructuring of teaching and learning processes and an indirect effect through peer effects on learning
and through the market forces of competition.  Of course, competitive pressures may result in higher
achievement in traditional public schools as well.
This paper focuses on student achievement in charter schools in Michigan.  The analyses presented
in the paper suggest that students attending charter schools in Michigan are not reaching the same levels
of achievement as students in traditional public schools in the same districts.  In order to analyze the
effectiveness of charter schools relative to their traditional public school counterparts, we examine the
difference in student outcomes, as measured by the Michigan Educational Assessment Program (MEAP).
The State makes available the MEAP results each year along with limited demographic data that are self-
reported by students when they take the tests.  We rely mainly on this data set together with additional
building- and district-level data that are supplied by local districts and made available on the Michigan
Department of Education’s (MDE’s) website.  Five years of MEAP scores—from 1996/97 through
200/01—for individual fourth and fifth grade students are analyzed. 
By pairing charter schools with their “host” (meaning geographically co-located) districts, we
attempt to create the local “market” for educational services in which both the charter schools and the
public school districts compete.  Several models of the difference between test score levels of students
attending  charter schools versus those from traditional public schools are estimated. 
 In virtually all specifications, each of which controls for student, building, and district characteristics,
students attending charter schools have lower test scores than students in traditional public schools.  The
magnitudes of the results vary by grade, year, and subject matter, but are generally on the order of 3–10
percent.  We argue that our estimates of the negative differentials may be biased toward zero because we
have not controlled for selection bias. 
1Gill et al. (2001) provide an exhaustive review of school improvement initiatives that rely on choice mechanisms
such as vouchers or charter schools.
Impact of Charter School Attendance on Student Achievement in Michigan
Proponents of school reform have argued that charter schools and vouchers can provide adequate
market pressure to improve the performance of traditional public schools.1  It is certainly the case that
charter schools have blossomed in number since their inception.  Minnesota passed the first charter school
law in 1991, and since then more than 30 states have put such laws in place.  Approximately 2,000 charter
schools are in operation nationwide, enrolling over 500,000 students.  Arizona, California, Texas, and
Michigan have led the movement, accounting for about 50 percent of those schools and over half of the
students.  While the number of charter schools and student enrollment have burgeoned, relatively little
attention has been paid to their effects on student achievement.
Are there theoretical reasons to expect that charter schools might have an effect on student
achievement?  We suggest that proponents of charter schools see a direct and an indirect chain of logic
to argue that charter schools will have a positive influence on student achievement.  The direct effect is
through the restructuring of the teaching and learning processes.  Individuals or groups establish a charter
school because they have an instructional or curriculum innovation they wish to implement, or because they
want regulatory relief from obstacles that they feel are an impediment to the learning process.  Charter
schools give them the opportunity to implement these innovations or remove the obstacles, and thus to
enhance student learning directly.  The indirect effect operates through peer effects on learning and through
the market forces of competition.  If student achievement is influenced by the composition of peers in the
classroom, and if charter schools attract students who are more serious or have other characteristics that
2See Hoxby (2002) for an analysis of the effects of charter school competition on public schools.
3We use the term “traditional” public schools to denote buildings administered by local districts, and not
chartered.
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are complementary to learning, then student performance in charter schools will exceed achievement in
traditional public schools.  In addition, the necessity of competing for students may cause charter schools
to emphasize student achievement under the assumption that parents and students value higher achievement
when choosing schools.  Of course, it may be the case that competitive pressures result in higher
achievement in traditional public schools as well, which would reduce or alleviate any achievement
advantage that charter schools might have.2
This paper focuses on student achievement in charter schools in Michigan.  Michigan’s law was
passed in 1993, and currently183 charter schools now enroll approximately 58,000 students, or about 3.4
percent of Michigan’s K-12 student enrollments.  The analyses presented here suggest that students
attending charter schools in Michigan are not reaching the same levels of achievement as students in
traditional public schools in the same districts.3  On the one hand, this result is not too surprising because
the charter schools are a reasonably new entity and they may be traversing a learning curve.  On the other
hand, the result is very surprising because there is strong evidence of positive selection into charter schools.
Enrollment requires active parental intervention, and some studies allege that charter schools’ application
and selection processes may allow student screening, even though this is illegal.  
The next section of the paper presents background information about charter schools in Michigan.
The following section describes our data.  Finally, we present the econometric analyses of the data and
draw conclusions.
3CHARTER SCHOOLS IN MICHIGAN
According to Michigan law, the primary purposes of charter schools—referred to as public school
academies (PSAs)—are as follows: 
C Improve pupil achievement;
C Stimulate innovative teaching methods;
C Create new professional opportunities for teachers;
C Achieve school-level accountability for educational performance;
C Provide parents and pupils with greater choices among public schools;
C Create competition among public schools to use state funds more effectively, efficiently,
and equitably (Horn and Miron, 1999, p. 18).
This set of purposes reflects the intent of the original proponents of charter schools (Hassel, 1999).  The
state legislation that authorized charter schools established a set of operating rules and practices.
Each school is authorized for a particular mission with identified and explicitly stated goals and purposes
unique to that mission.  Teachers must be certified just as they are at other public schools.  Schools may
not screen students, but they may limit the number of students they serve.  If more students apply than can
be enrolled, a random selection process is used.  Charter schools are free to choose their own core
curriculum, and are not required to provide services to meet the needs of all students, such as those with
special needs.  Charter schools are subject to all laws and regulations that apply to public schools, and they
receive the same state foundation grant on a per-pupil basis as do traditional public schools.  Charter
schools cannot charge tuition, but can raise funds through legal foundations and receive grants.
4State law requires that public educational institutions authorize charter schools.  Of the 183 charter
schools, 149 have been authorized by universities (or community colleges) and 34 by local public school
districts (including intermediate school districts).  Charter schools are governed by a board, which is
approved by the authorizing entity.  Board members are public officials and are subject to all applicable
laws.  Unlike regular school board members, however, they are not elected by parents or any other
specified group and, instead, are officially appointed by the authorizing institution.  
An evaluation of Michigan charter schools (Horn and Miron 1999) offers insights into their structure
and how closely they are able to adhere to the principles upon which the charter school law was
established.  To state succinctly, charter schools are intended to identify a specific set of goals, align their
resources to pursue those goals, offer ways to evaluate the performance in meeting the goals, and hold
teachers and administrators more accountable for educational achievement.  The evaluation cited several
shortcomings with respect to the current practices of charter schools, however, and recommended the need
for improvement in the following areas:  
C Vague mission statement and justification of the need for the charter school;
C Real or potential conflicts of interest among employees and board members;
C Lack of congruence between curriculum and the philosophy/mission of the school;
C Inappropriate or nonexistent assessment and evaluation procedures for students and
employees;
C Limited innovations being developed and applied in the charter schools (Horn and Miron,
1999, p. 101).
Of course, some charter schools did better than others in achieving their objectives.  
4The evaluation conducted by Horn and Miron did not examine differences in student test scores between PSAs
and regular public schools using regression analysis and controlling for additional factors. 
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DATA
In order to analyze the effectiveness of charter schools relative to their traditional public school
counterparts, we examine the difference in student outcomes, as measured by the Michigan Educational
Assessment Program (MEAP).4  The MEAP tests are convenient measures of the educational outcomes
of Michigan students since all public school students, including charter school students, are required to take
the tests.  The tests are administered to students in specific grade levels.  Most relevant for comparing
student performance in charter schools versus traditional public schools are the tests administered in the
fourth and fifth grades, since most charter schools in the state enroll  students in the primary grades.  The
State makes the MEAP results available each year, along with limited demographic data that are self-
reported by students when they take the tests.  We rely mainly on this data set together with additional
building- and district-level data that are supplied by local districts and made available on the Michigan
Department of Education’s website.  Five years of MEAP scores for individual fourth and fifth grade
students are available from 1996/97 through 2000/01.
The MEAP tests are criterion-referenced exams, so the “cut scores” may differ from year to year.
However, our analyses are based on levels, not passing rates, and the standards to which the MEAP is
aligned did not vary over the five years of our data.  Consequently, pooling the data over time is
appropriate.  The MEAP program consists of reading and mathematics tests in grade 4 and writing and
science tests in grade 5.  This makes it impossible to examine annual learning gains in specific subjects.
Nonetheless, in one model specification, we control for pre-test achievement by using the student’s MEAP
6score from the test taken the previous year.  We use the fourth grade mathematics test as proxy for a pre-
test for the fifth grade science test, and we use the fourth grade reading test as a pre-test for the fifth grade
writing.  The results using gains are qualitatively the same as the results using levels.  For the most part,
however, we rely on analyses of test score levels.  
The most rigorous way of determining the impact of charter school attendance on student test
scores would be through an experimental design in which students were randomly assigned to attend a
charter school or to attend a traditional public school.  This, of course, is not feasible.  So the analytical
question becomes what comparison group to use for charter school students.  It is well-known that test
score levels are highly correlated with student characteristics, particularly family income.  Thus,
comparisons across districts or schools may be biased against schools with high percentages of
disadvantaged students.  The ideal counterfactual would be those school districts and buildings that the
charter school students would have attended if there were no charter schools.  In practice, identifying these
districts and buildings is difficult.  Many of the charter school students come from private schools, and some
come from home schooling.  But even for students from public school backgrounds, charter schools are
not limited to specific district boundaries, so charter schools may attract students from several districts,
especially in urban or suburban areas.   
No charter school administrative data report where students would have enrolled in the absence
of charter schools.  So we were left with the task of trying to identify a reasonable comparison group of
students.  Our approach has been to use two different methods, which we think are reasonable bounds to
actual enrollment practices.  The first approach, which we title “Charter-District” matches, uses students
5From the available data, it is impossible to know exactly the set of “host” districts—i.e., the set of districts that
students  in the charter schools would have attended in the absence of the charter schools.  We used the document,
Directory of Michigan Public School Academies, supplied by the Michigan Department of Education for data on when
the charter school opened, grades served, and usage of an educational management company.  This document also
provides an Intermediate School District (ISD) and local school district for the charter school.  The local school districts
listed comprise our “host” districts with the following exceptions: Concord Academy of Antrim was matched with
Mancelona rather than Alba because of missing data; Questar Academy was matched with Carman-Ainsworth, Flint,
and Beecher; Traverse Bay Community School was matched with Traverse City rather than Elk Rapids because of
missing data; daVinci Institute and Paragon Charter Academy were matched with Jackson and Vandercook Lake; the
three charter schools in Kalamazoo County were matched with Kalamazoo and Portage; TriValley Academy was matched
with Muskegon and Orchard View; and Francis Reh PSA was matched with Saginaw City and Saginaw Township
schools.
6For example, of the 89 charter schools included in the sample (1998/99 data), 44 report that no student in their
school receives free and reduced price lunches.  It is unclear whether this reflects the student’s eligibility or poor
reporting.  Horn and Miron (1999) report that several principals indicated that they did not enroll eligible students in the
free lunch program because their school did not offer a hot lunch, and they did not see the point in pursuing their
eligibility.  
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from the local school districts  that “house” the charters as a comparison group.5  The assumption behind
this approach is that charter schools enroll only students from the traditional public schools in the districts
where they are located (with the few exceptions noted in the footnote).  The second approach, which we
title “Charter-ISD” matches uses all districts and school buildings in the intermediate school district where
they are located.  We provide empirical results using both approaches.
Adequate controls for the composition of students and other factors outside of the school’s control
are difficult to obtain.  The MEAP program is designed to allow district staff to denote whether the test
taker is eligible for free or reduced price lunch.  Reporting is very sporadic, however, making that variable
useless on an individual level.  The Michigan Department of Education (MDE) reports the percentage of
students eligible for free lunch on a building level, but many charter schools do not report these data to the
state.6  We do use the building-level eligibility percentages as supplied by MDE in our empirical analyses,
but these types of data problems make it very difficult to control for student characteristics.  
7Some states, notably South Carolina and Kentucky, use statewide tests  along with other factors to allocate
state resources to schools.  Michigan does not, but the State does award postsecondary scholarships to students based
on their middle school and high school MEAP tests.  
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We also acknowledge that the MEAP test scores, like any standardized test scores, are “loose”
indicators of student achievement.  The environmental conditions under which students take the test, test
coverage,  and student test-taking skills and anxiety all influence the extent to which the scores accurately
reflect what students actually know.  Furthermore, to the extent that a student’s performance on the MEAP
is related to the totality of their educational experiences prior to the exam, it is incorrect to attribute fully
the test score to the current school of attendance if students have transferred into that school.  Many of the
charter schools have recently opened, and so the proportion of students who have transferred in is much
higher than for traditional public schools. Finally, the MEAP test may not be aligned with the curriculum
established by the charter school.   Traditional public school administrators and teachers have also echoed
this criticism of the MEAP, which underscores the problems of using standardized test measures as
evaluation instruments.  
Nonetheless, the MEAP test is one of the few ways to compare the performance of all public
schools.  With greater attention given to accountability of schools, the State of Michigan, along with many
other states, has stressed the importance of the MEAP scores.7  Many Michigan school districts are
spending considerable time and resources to improve their performance on the MEAP.  Furthermore,
according to the evaluation, many charter schools use the MEAP as evidence of the success of their
8Researchers and evaluators use other measures of student outcomes, such as dropout rates (e.g., Hoxby, 1996).
However, since most charter schools include only grades K-8, dropout rates are not meaningful, and are not recorded.
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program and some charter schools list the MEAP test as their only evidence of student achievement (Horn
and Miron, 1999, p. 83).8    
We examine the MEAP test scores for all fourth and fifth grade students in charter schools, as well
as in the public schools of districts and ISDs within which the charter schools are located.  By pairing
charter schools with their “host” (meaning geographically co-located) districts, we attempt to create the
local “market” for educational services in which both the charter schools and the public school districts
compete.  Tables 1 and 2 provide descriptive statistics from the data set that we have constructed for fourth
graders and for fifth graders, respectively.  Except for a few observations that have been deleted because
of missing values for key variables, the number of students included in the table is exactly equal to those
who took the MEAP test in the districts included in the analyses.   The test is mandatory in Michigan, with
only a few waivers at the elementary level, so the number of test takers is a good proxy for the relative
number of students in traditional public and charter elementary schools.  Whereas on a statewide basis
charter schools enroll about 3.4 percent of all students, the table shows that charters account for about 9.4
percent of the fourth grade test takers (8.1 percent of the fifth graders) in the districts in our data set for the
2000/2001 school year.    
Note that, in general, charter schools have smaller enrollments and smaller class sizes than public
schools, although the differences are getting smaller over time as charter schools gain enrollment.  In fourth
grade for the latest year of data, the average building enrollment for charters was 356, which is about 87
percent of the average building enrollment in the traditional public schools.  In both tables 1 and 2, the
9In their evaluation, Horn and Miron (1999) report that although many charter schools formed during the first
few years targeted minority students, the trend in more recent years has been the opposite.  The percentage of white
students has risen from 35 percent in 1995 to about 60 percent in 1999.  
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earliest years of data show that the average student/teacher ratios for charter schools are between 18.1 to
18.6 for fourth and fifth graders.  In the last year of data, these ratios have risen to over 19.0.  On the other
hand, the traditional public schools’ average student/teacher ratios have declined over time from almost 24
to about 22.  Note, however, that even in the most recent year of data, the pupil/teacher ratio in charter
schools is about 80 percent of what it is in traditional public school.  
The ethnicity and poverty status of students in the two types of schools were quite different in the
earliest years of data, but have become more equal since.  Using District matches, the percent of students
eligible for free or reduced price lunches at the building level had been consistently 5– 10 percentage points
lower for charter schools than for traditional public schools in the first four years of data, but was actually
a few percentage points higher in 2000/01.  Similarly, the building data from the MDE show quite significant
nonwhite enrollment percentage differences between charter schools and traditional buildings (using district
matches) for the first three years of data, but the percentages are virtually identical in the most recent year
of data.  Clearly, the ethnicity and poverty characteristics of charter schools more closely resemble the
districts in which they are located than the ISDs.  In all years and in both grades, the ISD percentages of
students eligible for free or reduced price lunch and nonwhite students are much lower than the charter
school percentages.  There has been some concern about trends in the characteristics of charter school
students toward majority ethnicity and non-poor economic status.9   But our data do not confirm any such
trend, and in fact, the free lunch eligibility percentage and the nonwhite building enrollment percentage are
quite comparable to the traditional schools in the districts where the charter schools are located. 
10Due to reporting lags, the district financial variables–average teacher salary and average expenditures per
student are not yet available for the 2000/2001 school year.
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Average teacher salaries are much lower in charter schools.  In fact, they are approximately two-
thirds as large as the average salaries in traditional public schools in all four years of the data for which
salary information is available.10  Similarly, average expenditures per pupil are lower in charter schools,
although the gap between charters and traditional public schools in average expenditures per pupil is not
very large (between 5–10 percent).  These data, along with the much larger gaps in teacher salaries,
confirm the fact that charter schools spend a much larger share of their per pupil expenditures on
noninstructional items (see Good and Braden, 2000).
The average test score data in the  table presage the multivariate analyses of achievement results
presented below.  The average scores for students in charter schools are approximately two to three
percent lower than the scores for students in traditional public schools.  (These gaps translate to differences
that are approximately 0.3 to 0.4 standard deviations and are highly statistically significant.)  For example,
in the last year of data, the average math score is around 533 for fourth graders in traditional public schools
and about 519 for fourth graders in charter schools.  The averages for fifth graders for science are about
383 and 372, respectively.  When we examine the differences using the Charter-ISD matches, the
differences in test scores are even bigger.
ANALYSES
We have used several models to estimate the difference between test score levels of students
attending  charter schools versus those from traditional public schools.  Since we paired the charter school
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with public school districts (or ISDs), we use fixed effects to control for factors in the areas that are
common to both types of schools.  This approach helps to control for the average difference in students
across districts, but it does not control for differences between charter schools and public schools within
each district (or ISD). 
  We consider the MEAP test scores of fourth and fifth graders for five school years, 1996/97
through 2000/2001.  Test scores (in log form) are regressed on three groups of variables.  The first set of
variables is intended to control for individual differences across students.  It includes demographic
characteristics that are (self-)reported by the students—sex and race/ethnicity.
The second set of variables relates to school environment.  We include the building-level
pupil/teacher ratio and enrollment in logs.  Our expectation is that both of these variables will be negatively
related to test scores—larger class sizes impede instructional effectiveness, and larger schools (controlling
for larger class sizes) will tend to have lower achievement.  The third building-level variable that we have
used is the percentage of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch.  This variable is our measure of
poverty, and a considerable number of studies have found strongly negative causality between poverty and
student achievement levels.  
 The third set of variables, measured at the district level, is intended to measure the amount of
resources available:  average teacher salary and expenditure per pupil.  Average teacher salary is intended
to proxy for teacher quality.  Since PSAs and public schools are aligned within the same local area, the cost
of living is the same for schools within each local area.  As a result, the difference in teacher salaries reflects
the experience and educational qualifications of the teachers.  Salaries may also differ because of
compensating differentials with respect to work environments.  Teachers who prefer the charter school
11Unfortunately, average teacher salary was missing for many charter schools and was ultimately dropped from
the analyses.  We have estimated many of the models on the subset of data in which there is average teacher salary data,
and the results are largely unchanged.
13
environment may be more willing to work there for lower pay.11  Expenditures per pupil proxy the amount
of school-based resources available at the building level.  Our a priori expectation is that both of these
variables will be positively related to test scores.
In the estimates discussed below, the coefficients on these three sets of variables generally have
the expected signs and are statistically significant, both with and without fixed effects included.  Whereas
the primary focus of the paper is the difference in the level of student test scores between PSAs and
traditional public schools, it is noteworthy that the coefficients on the control factors are significant and have
the expected signs, and they are robust to alternative specifications.  Table 3 provides the estimates from
our preferred model specification, with fixed effects, using 1999/2000 school-year data for reading (fourth
grade test) and for science (fifth grade test), and using both the district match and ISD match for
constructing the comparison groups.  We present those results because that is the most recent year for
which we have the district financial data.
The table shows that among the personal characteristics that are available on the data set, female
students outperform males by about one percent on the reading test, and achieve virtually the same scores
on average on the science test (the differences are negative and statistically significant, but less than one-half
percentage point).  Nonwhites score about 2–3 percent lower on the reading test and about 3–4 percent
lower on the science test than white students.  
The building characteristics are generally all significant and of the expected negative sign.  The free
lunch eligibility percentage, building enrollment, and pupil/teacher ratio in the building are all negatively
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associated with reading and science scores (the exception is building enrollment for the district-matched
data for reading and ISD-matched data for science).  The free lunch eligibility percentage variable is scaled
to be between 0 and 1, so the mean school, which is about 50 percent in both traditional public schools
and charter schools, has student scores that are about 3–5 percent lower than a school with no students
eligible.
Resources seem to improve student achievement.  Expenditures per pupil in the district (for
traditional public schools) or at the building level (for charter schools) are positively related to test scores,
although the point estimates—which are elasticities—suggest a fairly small effect.  A five percent increase
in expenditures per pupil, which translates to about $350, is predicted to increase reading test scores by
about 1/4th percent, or about 1 point on average. 
In the models presented in table 3 and in virtually all specifications, students attending PSAs have
lower test scores than students in traditional public schools even after controlling for student, building, and
district characteristics.  The magnitude of the results vary by grade, year, and subject matter.  The
differentials are generally larger for those subjects that arguably are more dependent upon school-based
instruction than home-based instruction.  For example, the PSA differentials for fourth grade math and fifth
grade science and writing test scores are larger than the differentials for reading under most specifications.
One could argue that parental help with reading could mitigate the effects of inferior school-based
instruction.  Unfortunately, we do not have any measures of home-based activities to control for this effect.
Table 4 provides impact estimates from our basic specification for each of the four tests from each
year plus for the data pooled together for both the “charter-district” and “charter-ISD” matches.  The
dependent variables for these models were the logarithms of test score levels, so the coefficients presented
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in the table may be interpreted as percentages.  Note that students attending a charter school scored around
two to three percent lower on reading and math tests; the fifth grade students in PSAs scored about three
to four percent lower on the science test and about five to nine percent lower on the writing test.  All of
these results are strongly statistically significant.
The negative coefficients on the PSA dummy variable may be interpreted as the direct impacts of
charter schools, but they do not necessarily address the indirect impacts.  That is, the competition or
“threat” posed by charter schools may increase the test scores in traditional public schools, which of course
would be a positive impact on education.  In an earlier paper (Eberts and Hollenbeck, 2001), we reported
the results of tests for such an indirect effect.  Specifically, we used three years of MEAP test score data
and estimated the same models on all traditional public school buildings in all districts in Michigan, and
included a dummy variable for presence of a PSA in the district.  The results of this exercise showed that
fifth grade students in districts that “host” a charter school scored about one and one-half percent higher
on the writing test than students from other districts, controlling for student, building, and district
characteristics and about 0.15 percent higher on the science test.  But fourth grade students did not score
higher on the math or reading tests.
Since some PSAs enroll only students in grades K-4, one would hypothesize that the indirect
“threat” effect would be stronger in fourth grade, but the fourth grade effect was null.  The results suggested
that, if anything, the effect occurs in fifth grade.  However, the magnitude of the effect was a small fraction
of the size of the impact estimate and the trend in the “threat” effect exhibited a decrease over time.   All
in all, we concluded that there is little evidence for the indirect effect of charter schools on test performance.
12We also tested an interaction with a quadratic in the trend term, but it did not add any explanatory power.
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Charter schools are relatively new, so one possible explanation for the lower test scores of their
students may be the inexperience of PSA staff and the inefficiencies of starting up a new venture.  One
could also argue that students have not been enrolled long enough in charter schools to make a difference
in their performance.  However, table 4 does not seem to show a downward trend in the negative impacts
(except for writing) with more and more recent data.  We explicitly tested for a trend by adding to the
model an interaction between PSA status and years since the PSA opened.12  Table 5 shows the results
of this test for the pooled samples, and indeed, the PSAs do seem to improve their performance, but only
by about 0.3–0.5 percent per year for each of the tests.  If this trend continued in a linear trajectory, it
would then take about 10–13 years for students in PSAs to catch up to students in traditional public
schools. 
Some proponents of charter schools argue that school performance would improve if schools
would follow business practices more closely.  The majority of charter schools in Michigan are, in fact,
managed by for-profit businesses.  Table 6 shows the results of replacing the PSA dummy variable from
our basic specification with two variables, one indicating whether or not the PSA is managed by a for-profit
company (an educational management organization, or EMO) and the other indicating whether or not the
PSA is managed by some other entity.  The two variables are mutually exclusive and together represent
the entire group of PSAs that are in the previous analysis.  The results show that, in the early years of data,
PSAs managed by for-profit companies have lower test scores relative to public schools than do PSAs not
managed by for-profits.  However, in the last two years of data, the result is reversed.  Students at PSAs
13The procedures that we followed for matching students from 4th to 5th grade were as follows: (1) all
observations with missing values for ethnicity, gender, and date of birth were deleted; (2) remaining observations were
matched by district, building, ethnicity, gender, and date of birth; and (3) all observations with multiple matches were
deleted.  This procedure yielded a match rate of about 24 percent.  Many of the nonmatches were presumably due to
students moving to different schools. 
14The (zero-order) correlations between the 4 th grade reading test score and the 5th grade writing test score, and
between the 4th grade math test score and the 5th grade science test score, were on the order of 0.76.
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managed by EMOs still do worse than students from traditional public schools, but the students at PSAs
not managed by EMOs do even worse.  For virtually all of the tests, the five-year trends decrease in
magnitude for the EMO sample and increase in magnitude for the non-EMO sample.  The results for the
later years are consistent with the hypothesis that more business-like management practices yield better
student performance, as measured by test score levels, assuming that schools run by EMOs are not
systematically different from other charter schools with respect to the other variables in the model.  Note
that in Michigan, about 70 percent or more of the charter schools are managed by an EMO. 
The use of test score levels to compare the performance of schools is problematic, particularly
when only a limited number of variables are available to control for student characteristics and home- and
school-based resources.  As mentioned earlier, test score gains for individual students cannot be computed
because the MEAP tests cover different subjects each consecutive school year and because it is not
possible to track individual students across years with the publicly available data.  An alternative—albeit
inferior—approach may be pursued.  A substantial share of the fourth graders who took tests in the first
three years of our sample also took fifth grade tests the next year.  We matched these students’ records,
and then estimated a model in which the students’ fourth grade math score is used as a control variable for
fifth grade science; and the students’ fourth grade reading score is used as a control variable for fifth grade
writing.13,14  Table 7 presents the results from these estimations with fourth grade scores from 1998/1999
15This is the most recent year of data for which the match could be accomplished because the state no longer
reports date of birth.
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used as pretests for 1999/2000.15  The negative impacts for science and writing were attenuated slightly
from what is reported in table 4.  The science disadvantage decreased from about 3.2 percent to 1.6
percent, and the writing disadvantage declined from 7.8 percent to about 7.2 percent. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of individual student test scores suggests that charter schools, during their years of
operation in Michigan, have not improved student achievement relative to traditional public schools.  If
charter schools enrolled students who are academically challenged, then sample selection would be biased
against levels and gains in test scores for students in charter schools.  However, charter schools enroll
similar percentages of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch program and of minority ethnicity,
which are characteristics that tend to be correlated with lower achievement.  Furthermore, the active choice
by parents to send their children to charter schools would suggest that these students have home support
for education, which would suggest a bias in favor of higher levels and gains in test scores.  Consequently,
one could argue that our estimates of the differential between test scores of traditional public schools and
charters may be smaller than they actually are, since we have not controlled for this selection bias.
The results presented here on the effect of charter school attendance on student achievement  are
not conclusive.  Test scores are imperfect indicators of achievement.  While we examine test scores of
individual students, we are able to control for student and teacher characteristics in only a limited way and
some of our explanatory variables are based on aggregate building-level and district-level information.
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Were it possible to design a controlled experiment, or find an appropriate natural experiment so that we
could rigorously control for selection bias, we could have more confidence in the estimated gaps.
Nevertheless, our analyses suggest that despite the fact that charter schools have the ability to introduce
competition and new innovations in the provision of education, the evidence so far suggests that they will
need to make up considerable ground as they become more established in order to overtake the test score
levels and gains of students at traditional public schools.      
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Selected Student, Building, and District Characteristics, 4th Grade
96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01
Charter
Schools
Traditional
(District
Match)
Traditional
(ISD Match)
Charter
Schools
Traditional
(District
Match)
Traditional
(ISD Match)
Charter
Schools
Traditional
(District
Match)
Traditional
(ISD Match)
Charter
Schools
Traditional
(District
Match)
Traditional
(ISD Match)
Charter
Schools
Traditional
(District
Match)
Traditional
(ISD Match)
Number of
schools/districts
30 324/25 993/183 62 448/42 1156/249 91 528/52 1285/303 119 632/64 1449/331 119 717/69 1462/314
Number of students 724 12,424 49,588 1,611 17,569 56,237 2,733 20,874 63,136 4,036 27,141 76,440 4,421 42,779 89,711
Female 48.3% 50.6% 50.0% 50.0% 51.3% 50.7% 49.8% 50.5% 50.3% 50.7% 50.7% 50.4% 51.0% 50.9% 50.4%
Nonwhite 58.3% 61.5% 29.7% 58.4% 50.0% 27.5% 62.9% 51.7% 27.1% 63.8% 48.1% 25.1% 65.4% 56.0% 33.8%
Free lunch
eligibility, bldg.a
51.7% 59.6% 39.0% 49.0% 55.3% 39.6% 51.2% 56.5% 39.9% 49.9% 54.8% 37.8% 54.4% 51.5% 38.1%
Nonwhite
enrollment, bldg. a
42.4% 65.2% 33.4% 48.0% 55.9% 32.8% 52.5% 56.6% 31.9% 53.5% 54.1% 30.0% 52.7% 52.5% 31.9%
Average
enrollment, bldg.
197.9 470.1 436.3 241.4 440.3 420.0 273.6 420.3 408.9 314.9 409.2 404.3 356.4 410.1 402.2
Average pupil/
teacher ratio, bldg.
18.3 23.6 23.8 18.3 23.3 23.4 18.7 22.3 22.4 18.9 21.5 21.7 19.1 22.0 21.8
Average teacher
salary, dist.a
$31,317 $47,133 $48,679 $32,310 $47,606 $47,214 $31,314 $47,657 $47,169 $34,974 $49,058 $48,263 NA NA NA
Avg. expenditure/
pupil, dist.
$5,967 $6,245 $6,116 $5,974 $6,419 $6,096 $5,899 $6,775 $6,266 $6,255 $7,096 $6,657 NA NA NA
Mean math score 506.7 522.7 529.5 522.5 535.4 539.0 517.3 532.2 538.0 516.5 536.3 541.4 518.9 532.7 538.4
Mean reading score 304.0 310.9 313.7 309.8 316.1 318.4 307.8 314.9 318.5 303.6 314.1 317.6 305.3 313.1 316.1
a Sample size is reduced because of missing values.
NA = Data not yet available.
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Selected Student, Building, and District Characteristics, 5th Grade
96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01
Charter
Schools
Traditional
(District
Match)
Traditional
(ISD Match)
Charter
Schools
Traditional
(District
Match)
Traditional
(ISD Match)
Charter
Schools
Traditional
(District
Match)
Traditional
(ISD Match)
Charter
Schools
Traditional
(District
Match)
Traditional
(ISD Match)
Charter
Schools
Traditional
(District
Match)
Traditional
(ISD Match)
Number of
schools/districts
36 343/27 946/184 58 434/39 1127/239 86 510/50 1252/297 116 627/64 1420/334 121 702/70 1415/318
Number of students 616 13,294 47,959 1,330 18,641 59,224 2,073 21,018 65,664 3,221 27,942 77,612 3,920 44,332 94,329
Female 47.9% 50.3% 49.5% 53.2% 50.4% 49.6% 50.9% 50.2% 49.9% 49.7% 50.2% 49.8% 51.9% 50.5% 50.1%
Nonwhite 54.1% 51.8% 27.7% 57.4% 50.9% 29.0% 58.1% 49.6% 26.9% 63.2% 49.4% 26.0% 65.9% 56.5% 33.7%
Free lunch
eligibility, bldg.a
51.7% 57.3% 39.8% 47.4% 57.3% 40.5% 49.4% 57.4% 40.3% 49.6% 55.8% 38.0% 54.3% 52.3% 38.3%
Nonwhite
enrollment, bldg. a
46.4% 60.3% 33.8% 46.7% 59.4% 34.2% 51.5% 57.3% 32.8% 52.6% 55.9% 31.0% 53.4% 53.3% 32.4%
Average
enrollment, bldg.
195.1 465.1 438.1 247.4 440.5 424.8 280.7 423.2 415.4 316.3 415.0 411.4 361.0 412.2 407.1
Average pupil/
teacher ratio, bldg.
18.6 23.3 23.7 18.1 23.2 23.3 18.8 22.2 22.4 18.6 21.4 21.7 19.3 22.2 21.9
Average teacher
salary, dist.a
$30,402 $47,449 $48,624 $31,781 $47,285 $47,425 $31,529 $47,809 $47,215 $34,872 $49,057 $48,294 NA NA NA
Avg. expenditure/
pupil, dist.
$5,776 $6,255 $6,106 $6,027 $6,393 $6,125 $5,887 $6,779 $6,302 $6,268 $7,096 $6,660 NA NA NA
Mean science score 372.0 385.4 389.3 375.6 387.3 390.3 367.8 382.0 388.2 372.6 389.2 394.9 372.5 383.4 390.6
Mean writingb
score
2.45 2.57 2.67 2.41 2.48 2.57 2.23 2.35 2.43 2.28 2.48 2.55 2.20 2.41 2.46
a Sample size is reduced because of missing values.
b Writing tests were graded with 4-classification rubric, and so grades take on values between one and four.
NA = Data not yet available.
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Table 3 Coefficients from a Model Explaining Test Score Levels Using Preferred
Specification, 1999/2000 
(absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses)
Characteristic
4th Grade Reading 5th Grade Science
District Match ISD Match District Match ISD Match
PSA (=1) –0.021
(11.02)
–0.028
(21.82)
–0.032
(14.08)
–0.037
(24.34)
Student Characteristics
Female 0.011
(13.73)
0.010
(19.36)
–0.003
(2.90)
–0.006
(10.50)
Nonwhite –0.027
(24.03)
–0.022
(28.91)
–0.044
(35.83)
–0.032
(43.11)
Building Characteristics
Percentage free or reduced
price lunch
–0.059
(21.29)
–0.064
(48.94)
–0.086
(28.65)
–0.080
(55.69)
Enrollment (log) 0.0009
(0.69)
0.0018
(2.31)
–0.0082
(5.25)
–0.0006
(0.75)
Pupil/teacher (log) –0.011
(3.38)
–0.077
(3.85)
–0.013
(3.43)
–0.015
(6.75)
District Characteristics
Expenditure per pupil (log) 0.047
(7.16)
0.038
(16.05)
0.054
(7.06)
0.043
(16.39)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
0.1411 0.1063 0.2002 0.1496R 2
Sample size 31,177 80,476 31,163 80,833
Note: Table entries are coefficients from an OLS regression of log test score levels.  Observations for which
percentage free or reduced price lunch was missing used sample mean percentage.  This highly inflates the t-
statistics on that variable.
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Table 4 Impact Estimates of Enrollment in Charter Schools on Test Score Levels, by Year 
(absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses)
Year
4th Grade 5th Grade
Math Reading Science Writing
Charter – District Match
1996/97 –0.028
(8.54)
–0.015
(3.52)
–0.037
(8.11)
–0.069
(5.37)
1997/98 –0.026
(13.38)
–0.019
(6.76)
–0.035
(12.20)
–0.059
(6.66)
1998/99 –0.026
(15.89)
–0.024
(10.44)
–0.040
(13.49)
–0.050
(7.29)
1999/00 –0.022
(16.26)
–0.021
(11.02)
–0.032
(14.08)
–0.078
(11.84)
2000/01 –0.021
(24.20)
–0.021
(16.78)
–0.024
(16.62)
–0.086
(21.52)
Pooled, 
1996/97—2000/01
–0.028
(53.18)
–0.026
(35.44)
–0.035
(40.57)
–0.075
(31.06)
Charter – ISD Match
1996/97 –0.036
(16.31)
–0.024
(7.81)
–0.040
(11.98)
–0.081
(8.56)
1997/98 –0.026
(18.35)
–0.019
(9.58)
–0.030
(14.14)
–0.055
(7.89)
1998/99 –0.027
(23.71)
–0.024
(15.20)
–0.036
(18.23)
–0.052
(10.97)
1999/00 –0.029
(31.13)
–0.028
(21.82)
–0.037
(24.34)
–0.080
(18.09)
2000/01 –0.028
(34.22)
–0.026
(22.03)
–0.029
(22.40)
–0.096
(25.96)
Pooled,
1996/97—2000/01
–0.034
(70.49)
–0.030
(45.56)
–0.039
(51.24)
–0.086
(39.55)
Note: Table entries are coefficients from an OLS regression of log test score levels on a dummy variable that is set to
1 for PSA enrollment, 0 otherwise.  Other independent variables include student race = nonwhite; student sex;
building percentage eligibility for free or reduced price lunch; log building enrollment; log building pupil/teacher
ratio; log district expenditure per pupil; district fixed effects; and test year (for pooled year estimates).  Observations
for which percentage free or reduced price lunch was missing used sample mean percentage.  Sample sizes for each
cell of the table in the “Charter – District” panel are approximately 30,000 for the individual years and 130,000 for the
pooled sample, and adjusted R2 values range from 0.08 to 0.19.  Sample sizes for each cell of the table in the “Charter
– ISD” panel are approximately 65,000 for the individual years and 350,000 for the pooled sample, and adjusted R2
values range from 0.08 to 0.19.
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Table 5 Impact Estimates of Enrollment in Charter Schools on Test Score Levels, and the
Trend in Impact Estimates 
(absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses)
Variable
4th Grade 5th Grade
Math Reading Science Writing
District Matches
PSA = 1 –0.040
(24.64)
–0.047
(20.98)
–0.050
(18.74)
–0.124
(16.76)
PSA * yrs. since opening 0.003
(7.86)
0.005
(9.92)
0.003
(5.80)
0.011
(6.77)
ISD Matches
PSA = 1 –0.036
(36.75)
–0.037
(27.29)
–0.043
(25.83)
–0.111
(22.95)
PSA * yrs. since opening 0.001
(3.66)
0.002
(6.08)
0.001
(3.40)
0.005
(5.16)
Note: Table entries are coefficients from an OLS regression of log test score levels.  Sample was pooled over all five
years of the data.  Other independent variables include student race = nonwhite; student sex; building percentage
eligibility for free or reduced price lunch; log building enrollment; log building pupil/teacher ratio; log district
expenditure per pupil; and district fixed effects.  Observations for which percentage free or reduced price lunch was
missing used sample mean percentage.  Sample sizes for each cell in the upper panel of the table are approximately
130,000, and adjusted R2 values range from 0.11 to 0.17.  Sample sizes for each cell in the lower panel of the table are
approximately 350,000 and adjusted R2 values range from 0.09 to 0.15.
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Table 6 Impact Estimates of Enrollment in Charter Schools on Test Score Levels, by Year
and by Whether the Charter School is Run by an EMO 
(absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses)
Year
4th Grade 5th Grade
Math Reading Science Writing
EMO Non-EMO EMO Non-EMO EMO Non-EMO EMO Non-EMO
District Matches
1996/97 –0.031
(8.74)
–0.016
(2.57)
–0.019
(4.02)
–0.001
(0.19)
–0.047
(9.07)
–0.012
(1.62)
–0.097
(6.84)
0.010
(0.46)
1997/98 –0.027
(12.91)
–0.024
(7.20)
–0.020
(6.77)
–0.014
(3.06)
–0.035
(11.03)
–0.035
(7.39)
–0.059
(6.08)
–0.057
(3.93)
1998/99 –0.029
(16.64)
–0.015
(5.45)
–0.028
(11.65)
–0.005
(1.35)
–0.044
(14.18)
–0.022
(4.42)
–0.058
(8.14)
–0.012
(0.99)
1999/00 –0.024
(16.24)
–0.018
(9.77)
–0.023
(11.26)
–0.016
(6.19)
–0.028
(11.31)
–0.039
(12.78)
–0.075
(10.30)
–0.085
(9.47)
2000/01 –0.020
(17.41)
–0.024
(17.89)
–0.019
(11.82)
–0.025
(12.71)
–0.021
(11.75)
–0.027
(12.54)
–0.084
(16.46)
–0.090
(14.71)
Pooled,
1996/97–2000/01
–0.030
(46.79)
–0.026
(28.94)
–0.028
(31.91)
–0.023
(18.19)
–0.035
(34.06)
–0.035
(24.25)
–0.075
(26.24)
–0.074
(18.34)
ISD Matches
1996/97 –0.038
(15.58)
–0.030
(5.81)
–0.027
(8.04)
–0.010
(1.40)
–0.048
(12.61)
–0.016
(2.49)
–0.108
(10.06)
0.004
(0.21)
1997/98 –0.027
(16.94)
–0.021
(7.86)
–0.021
(9.40)
–0.011
(2.86)
–0.031
(12.76)
–0.028
(6.70)
–0.058
(7.39)
–0.038
(2.80)
1998/99 –0.030
(24.37)
–0.014
(6.26)
–0.029
(17.04)
–0.003
(0.85)
–0.040
(18.67)
–0.018
(4.58)
–0.061
(11.66)
–0.018
(1.84)
1999/00 –0.030
(27.21)
–0.027
(18.62)
–0.029
(19.44)
–0.025
(12.52)
–0.033
(18.10)
–0.044
(18.65)
–0.082
(15.50)
–0.076
(11.01)
2000/01 –0.027
(25.10)
–0.031
(24.33)
–0.024
(15.72)
–0.029
(16.19)
–0.024
(14.64)
–0.035
(17.95)
–0.092
(19.33)
–0.101
(17.97)
Pooled,
1996/97–2000/01
–0.034
(60.07)
–0.032
(39.37)
–0.031
(39.60)
–0.028
(24.21)
–0.038
(41.25)
–0.041
(31.88)
–0.088
(33.55)
–0.081
(22.00)
Note: Table entries are coefficients from an OLS regression of log tests score levels.  Other independent variables
include student race = nonwhite; student sex; building percentage eligibility for free or reduced price lunch; log
building enrollment; log building pupil/teacher ratio; log district expenditure per pupil; district fixed effects; and test
year (for pooled year estimates).  Observations for which percentage free or reduced price lunch was missing used
sample mean percentage.  Sample sizes for each cell of the table in the “District” panel are approximately 30,000 for
the individual years and 130,000 for the pooled sample, and adjusted R2 values range from 0.08 to 0.19.  Sample sizes
for each cell of the table in the “ISD” panel are approximately 65,000 for the individual years and 350,000 for the
pooled sample, and adjusted R2 values range from 0.08 to 0.19.
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Table 7 Impact Estimates of Enrollment in Charter Schools on 5th Grade Test Score
Levels in 1999/2000 Controlling for 4th Grade Pre-tests
(absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses)
Characteristic
Charter–District Match Charter–ISD Match
Science Writing Science Writing
PSA = 1 –0.016
(5.48)
–0.072
(7.57)
–0.011
(5.55)
–0.060
(9.27)
Note: Table entries are coefficients from OLS regressions of log 1999/2000 test score levels.  Other independent
variables include log 1998/1999 test scores, student race = nonwhite; student sex; building percentage eligibility for
free or reduced price lunch; log building enrollment; log building pupil/teacher ratio; log district expenditures per
pupil; log pretest score; and district fixed effects.  Observation for which percentage free or reduced price lunch was
missing used sample mean percentage.  Sample size for the “Charter–District” match in columns 1 and 2 is about
11,000 and adjusted R2 are 0.48 and 0.20.  Sample size for the “Charter–ISD” match in columns 3 and 4 is about 34,000
and adjusted R2 are 0.46 and 0.18.
